The Laws of Interrogation (Part I)

For the most part I have been avoiding the issue of torture. This is for two reasons: First, the issue has become polarized in the publics’ eyes and many fail to take into account the differences between torture and accepted interrogation techniques; second, it is a legal gray area with no distinct guidelines or rules. Due to the enormity that this issue has in the mind of the public, I am dedicating the following two posts to the issues surrounding torture, specifically an accused foreign terrorist’s rights during interrogation.

In this first post, I will focus on the legal arguments lending themselves to the allowance of enhanced interrogation techniques. This starts with a definition of said techniques by the Geneva Convention: “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.” This definition, while ambiguous, very clearly states that no form of physical or mental harm should befall a POW in the search for intelligence. What many don’t realize however is that interrogation techniques such as yelling or pounding ones fist on a table (both legal actions in the American judicial system) would be considered forms of mental torture under these guidelines. This being said, the articles of the convention clearly state that it is only POWs who are to receive these rights. As terrorists are not POWs (see previous post) and have no real defined title, they are not protected from said techniques.

The later articles of the Geneva Convention give protection to civilians in an occupied state. The guidelines state that any citizen who is suspected or caught participating in any action that is a threat to the security of the state are held accountable by the laws of that state and furthermore they are protected from physical harm so long as such protection is not “prejudicial to the security of such State.” While this seems like it prohibits physical torturing of accused terrorists, the final clause “prejudicial to the security of such State” implies that so long as the information held by the terrorist could prevent future harm to the state, the accused is not protected. This in effect gives any nation the legal ability to interrogate an accused terrorist if they are suspected of having knowledge of future plans.